Nokia’s Here Maps Its Future On Samsung With Its First Android And Tizen Apps

#GNN Tech - Opera may have taken some of the wind out of the Nokia brand’s sails with the news that its browser will be replacing Nokia’s on the now-Microsoft-owned, winding down, feature handset business. But today the Finnish company that has remained after the Microsoft handset sale had some interesting news of its own: it’s tying up with Samsung for two new versions of its Here mapping product, a free Android version coming first to Samsung’s Galaxy line of devices, and a Tizen version for Samsung’s Tizen-powered smart devices, specifically the Gear smartwatch.

Nokia says that Here app will be available on Samsung Galaxy devices exclusively. We have asked the company when it plans to make it available to other Android handsets and will update this as we learn more. (Update: there will be availability elsewhere, but no timeline when. “HERE for Android is part of our partnership with Samsung, but we aim to make HERE available to as many people as possible,” a Here spokesperson tells me, adding that it will be sometime “later this year.” Another spokesperson tells us that Here for Samsung Galaxy smartphones will be rolled out at the same time that the Gear S starts to retail — further strengthening the link between the two pieces of news and the functionality.

The new apps are coming at a key time for Samsung, which is trying more and more to differentiate itself from the rest of the Android pack — the world’s most popular mobile platform, but also the most widely used by a variety of OEMs alongside Samsung — and create services that are unique to its devices alone.

Samsung is currently the world’s most popular maker of Android-based smartphones and other devices, but it has a lot of competition coming after it, from established competitors like LG to those like Xiaomi from China cleaning up in its home market and very clearly looking at growing more.

At the same time, it’s looking for ways of driving more interest in its new wearable device — hence tying the functionality together to incentivize consumers to stay within the Samsung ecosystem.

Mapping has been one of the “killer apps” of the new age of mobile, with location-based services helping our always-on, always-present devices becoming companions for our everyday lives and the things we like and need to do, taking things like smartphones beyond basic functions like making voice calls and sending texts to others.

For Here, the interesting thing is that the Samsung apps are the result of a licensing deal between the two companies — meaning that Here will have received some form of payment as part of it.

That’s important for a company that only recently, after losing a lot of money for years, been just about breaking even — or reporting a slight loss, depending on whether you count its non-IFRS or IFRS-reported numbers. Even though maps may be a core part of our mobile usage these days, that hasn’t always translated into them being a strong revenue generator.

And the moves come as Here is undergoing a reorganization of its own: Michael Halbherr, a longtime Here exec, stepped down as CEO last week.

The Android app will work much like it does on Windows Phone and iOS devices — users will be able to access maps for some 200 countries, see turn-by-turn navigation, search for businesses and other places of interest, and access the maps using GPS when there is no network connectivity available.

The Tizen Gear app, meanwhile, will mean that users of the Galaxy smartphones will be able to sync up their maps between their devices. The idea here is that for some situations mapping will be easier to plan on one device, but to use on the other. The apps will also integrate with in-car systems and integrate with mapping apps that run across all three, such as location-sharing app Glympse.

#Microsoft, #Samsung, And Expensive Free #Software

#GNN - In a #world where #Windows is cheaper than #free software, things get weird.

Microsoft and Samsung are currently locked in a public pissing match over royalties. Samsung previously agreed to pay Microsoft for use of the software company’s intellectual property relating to the South Korean firm’s sale of Android-based devices.

Samsung, like a host of other Android OEMs, pays Microsoft dollars for what the software company views as stepping on its intellectual properties’ toes. However, unlike other Android OEMs, Samsung stopped sending checks.

According to Microsoft, Samsung decided that it didn’t have to follow the contract it signed in 2011 after Microsoft announced its intention to buy Nokia’s hardware assets. It vigorously pushes back against the idea in its suit, going on to claim that Samsung is “attempting to convert a commercial contract dispute governed by U.S. law into a Korean regulatory issue.”

Samsung, according to Microsoft, has asked “Korean competition authorities to change the parties’ private contract by reducing or eliminating Samsung’s contractually-mandated Android patent royalty payments for Microsoft’s patents.” Microsoft claims that “almost all” the patents in question were “granted by countries other than Korea,” making Samsung’s appeal to Korean authorities off-kilter to Microsoft.

Since we can’t read the contract in question, and Microsoft’s filed suit is heavily redacted, it’s hard to parse who is right in the case, but it does seem to be a case in which there will be a clear winner: If Microsoft broke the terms of the agreement with its large purchase of Nokia assets, Samsung will likely win. If it didn’t, Samsung likely won’t.

(There is obviously more to this than Microsoft’s own accounting. I reached out to Samsung with a few questions relating to the lawsuit, but the company didn’t provide comment further than saying that it “will review the complaint in detail and determine appropriate measures in response.”)

This was all brought around for me today when Re/Code’s Ina Fried pointed out that if Samsung manages to win the suit, it could unlock other Android OEMs — perhaps — from their deals. There’s a lot of nuance to that point, but it remains an interesting potentiality. It isn’t clear, for example, if other Android OEM contracts that Microsoft has signed contain what the terms that Samsung feels grant it freedom from its agreement — if they do, and Samsung wins, the response could be swift and uniform.

Free Windows And Paid Android
Component to the above muddle is the fact that for smaller devices — including Windows Phone units — the relevant Microsoft operating system is now free. As it’s been pointed out again and again, for OEMs, Windows is now the cheaper platform than Android: Mobile OEMs pay Microsoft to use Android, but they don’t pay Microsoft to use Windows.

Silly stuff, really.

Losing Android fees would be difficult for Microsoft. Not only would Microsoft take a revenue impairment, it would remove the cost of Android, nixing an advantage for Windows Phone. In an era in which Android is quickly becoming the de facto mobile operating system, Microsoft doesn’t want to give up any edge.

The other side of that coin is the simple argument that Microsoft’s cost advantage over Android has hardly led to a stampede of OEMs coming to its corner, or lots of new market share. Both remain theoretical future events.

All of that is merely part of Microsoft’s larger fears. The loss of Android revenue would sting, and the loss of a booster seat for Windows Phone would be difficult, but Microsoft frames its argument in broader terms, looping in its full IP stack as under assault:

6. Microsoft’s continued success depends in substantial part on its ability to maintain and protect the proprietary technology it creates through its investments in research and development. It has developed innovative licensing programs whereby competitors and others may license Microsoft’s patent-protected technology in return for royalty payments, other consideration, or both.

7. One such program is the Android patent licensing program. Android, which is operating system software designed for mobile devices, infringes many Microsoft patents that were obtained by Microsoft in the United States and elsewhere well before Android was launched. Rather than exercise its legal right to exclude Android-based devices from practicing that technology, Microsoft licenses its patent portfolio to companies that utilize Android, including Samsung — the world’s largest producer of Android-based smartphones and tablets.

The crux is simple: Microsoft’s contention that its larger intellectual property business is at risk only makes sense if it is not at fault in the case, which is to say that it didn’t break the terms of the Samsung deal by buying Nokia’s hardware assets, and that Samsung’s actions will be upheld by the court. Only under those circumstances is Microsoft’s ability to derive revenue from its expensively accumulated intellectual property under threat.

Either way, the case matters and there are more eyes on it than just those of Samsung and Microsoft.

IMAGE BY FLICKR USER KENNETH LU UNDER CC BY 2.0 LICENSE (IMAGE HAS BEEN MODIFIED)

How The Nokia Purchase Will Impact Microsoft’s Financials

Microsoft’s purchase of Nokia’s hardware business appears set to sail through, having passed shareholder and regulator approval. The 5.44 billion euro deal will see “substantially all of Nokia’s Devices & Services business” become part of Microsoft, according to the companies.

The deal will allow Microsoft to wrest control of its smartphone platform from a third-party that had increasing hegemony over its end-user experience. Nokia has become the de facto Windows Phone manufacturer, as its rising unit volume met slackening competition due to flagging OEM interest.

What will the financial impacts of the Nokia deal be for Microsoft? Two questions need to be answered: Compared to Microsoft’s revenue, how large is the Nokia purchase in terms of relative top line? Also, what impact can we expect Nokia’s hardware business to have on Microsoft’s earnings per share?

To explore these issues we will source data from both companies, their joint statement, and industry forecasts. We’ll first examine Nokia’s net sales compared to Microsoft revenue, and then weigh their net incomes to determine an expected percentage and dollar decline in Microsoft’s earnings per share using historical data.

Revenue
Microsoft says it will purchase “substantially all of Nokia’s Devices and Services business,” a statement that is far too generic to use. Happily, it supplied another figure that is quite useful: In 2012, the portion of Nokia that it will purchase generated 14.9 billion euro in net sales.

According to Nokia, the larger Devices and Services group had net sales of 15.686 billion euro in 2012. So, Microsoft is buying assets that drive around 95% of Devices and Services’ net sales.

We can use that figure to estimate calendar 2013 Devices and Services revenue, which we can then compare to Microsoft’s same-period revenue to get a good handle on their relative scale. 2012 data isn’t acceptable, as Nokia has shrunk in the interim while Microsoft has grown, distorting the comparison.

Nokia’s calendar 2013 Q1, Q2, and Q3 net sales totaled 17.209 billion euro. In that three-quarter period, 8.51 billion euro came from the Devices and Services division, or 49.5%. This is a good number, as it jibes with Microsoft’s comment that the Devices and Services net sales from 2012 that is attributable to what it is purchasing was “almost 50 percent of Nokia’s net sales for the full year 2012.”

The market expects Nokia to report 6 billion euros in net sales in calendar Q4 of 2013. Given that half of Nokia revenue is Devices and Services, we can expect that division to generate 3 billion euro in net sales. That added to the extant 8.51 billion net sales tally from the first three-quarters of calendar 2013 implies that Nokia’s Devices and Services division should have net sales of around 11.51 billion euro in the full year.

Converting that to dollars at current exchange rates, we can see that Nokia’s Devices and Services division’s net sales tally for calendar 2013 should be around $15.8 billion. Microsoft’s cut of that total top line is 95%, or $15.01 billion.

So, in 2013 if Microsoft had owned the pieces of Nokia that it will shortly, its revenue tally would have added just over $15 billion in net sales. We’re speaking loosely by comparing Nokia net sales to Microsoft’s revenue figures, but as the comparison is more conservative on the Nokia side, I don’t mind that much.

To compare Nokia’s calendar 2013 we must stack it next to corresponding fiscal quarters from Microsoft, which operates on its own calendar. So, we’ll need to tally revenue from Microsoft’s fiscal Q3 and Q4 of 2013, and its fiscal Q1 and Q2 of 2014. As with Nokia, we’ll use average investor estimates for the current quarter (fiscal Q2 2014 for Microsoft, calendar Q4 2013 for Nokia):

1. FQ3 2013: $20.49 billion
2. FQ4 2013: $19.90 billion
3. FQ1 2014: $18.53 billion
4. FQ2 2014: $23.7 billion [Expected]

That totals to $82.62 billion.

We can now compare: Nokia’s Devices and Services net sales tally for calendar 2013 that would be attributable to Microsoft totaled $15.01 billion, including its forecasted fourth quarter. That is 18.17% of Microsoft’s revenue in same-period.

For a slightly more hatcheted comparison, Nokia’s net sales will be between 1/6th and 1/5th of Microsoft’s revenue in the period.

So, Microsoft’s top line will grow by less than 20% after the purchase. The purchase lowers the cost of its shares on a sales multiple basis, reduces its balance sheet value by unloading cash, and, as we’ll see, hurts its earnings per share. Let’s get to that last bit.

Earnings Per Share
For earnings per share, let’s take a look at the most recently reported quarter for each company, and work out what the impact of Nokia’s recent net loss would be on Microsoft’s earnings per share. EPS, of course, is a number closely correlated with a company’s stock price.

We’ll only deal with figures from Nokia’s Devices and Services group as they are the relevant sums.

Microsoft had net income of $5.244 billion, and the Nokia division -$116.97 million (as reported: -85 million euro). However, Microsoft absorbs 95% of that. We’re presuming here that Microsoft’s share of net sales will be equivalent to its share of profits (losses). So, the division’s net loss comes to $111.12 million.

Microsoft had an earnings per share ratio of $8.46 billion:$1 in the quarter. If we deduct the $111.12 million loss that Nokia would have contributed if Microsoft owned its future assets in the most recent quarter, it would have had net income of $5.133 billion.

Using the same ratio, we can see that Microsoft would have had not $0.62 in earnings per share as before, but $0.6067 per share, or just over a penny less per share. So, we can predict that on a quarterly basis, Nokia’s losses will have a minimal impact on Microsoft EPS figure, and therefore, ostensibly, its share price.

You could argue that the impact to Microsoft’s margins will be more material, which is fair, but at a minimum the EPS impact of the Nokia buy assuming no new material deterioration in the assets in question will be negligible.

Conclusions
Nokia will bring to Microsoft revenue each year of roughly equivalent size to two quarters of its new Devices and Consumer groups top line. On a revenue basis (or sales multiple basis, if you prefer), Microsoft will become cheaper, assuming its stock price remains static.

However, its gross and operating margins appear set to decline, as will its net profit and earnings per share, even if only in a minor way.

Still, the move by Microsoft to deploy dully performing foreign cash reserves to add nearly 20% to its top line in one move, opening the door to future accelerating profits, is appealing.

The above presumes, of course that Microsoft can in fact wring profits from its shiny new Nokia assets, and employees.

Microsoft wanted to get into hardware business. Welcome!

Top Image Credit: Flickr
–
For fun, here’s the mental doodles that this post was derived from.

End Of An Era, As Nokia Shareholders Approve $7.2BN Deal For Sale Of Devices Business To Microsoft

Nokia’s shareholders have approved the sale of its devices & services unit to Microsoft at an EGM held today in Helsinki, the FT reports. The transaction is still expected to close in the first quarter of next year (subject to regulatory approvals), with Nokia in a caretaker role of its own mobile making division until early 2014.

Update: Nokia has now confirmed the outcome of the shareholders’ vote in a press release, which notes that: “More than 99 % of the votes cast at the EGM were in favor of this proposal.”

It’s the end of an era for Nokia. And also closes a recent chapter for the business which started when it appointed its first non-Finnish CEO, and also former Microsoft executive, Stephen Elop to the top job back in September 2010. Elop went on to forge a partnership with Microsoft over its Windows Phone OS, and ultimate sever ties with Nokia’s own software platforms. From that handshake, to today’s full stop.

The acquisition of Nokia’s mobile making division was announced at the start of September, with Microsoft agreeing to pay €5.44 billion ($7.2 billion) in cash to acquire ”substantially all of Nokia’s Devices & Services business, license Nokia’s patents, and license and use Nokia’s mapping services”.

The Devices and Services portion of the acquisition accounts for €3.79 billion, with the patent licensing deal making up the remaining €1.65 billion, the pair said at the time. The news sent Nokia’s shares climbing steeply, and they’ve been tracking upwards since with the stock roughly doubling since the deal with announced. Nokia chair Risto Siilasmaa made that point to shareholders at today’s EGM.

The shareholders had been expected to approve the deal, despite some rumblings of discontent among Finnish investors dismayed to see Nokia sell off what was formerly the jewel in the company crown and indeed, for many years, in Finland’s crown to a foreign company.

According to Times journalist Nic Fildes, tweeting from the EGM, the deal was a done-deal before the vote at the meeting with 99% of pre-registered shareholder votes (78%) voting to approve it. Elop was also apparently in attendance at the meeting, although he left the talking to Siilasmaa.

The sale will remove some 32,000 staff from Nokia’s payroll (and add them to Microsoft’s books), substantially shrinking Nokia’s headcount costs, as well as injecting some much-needed cash back into the remaining business.

Up until recently Nokia was burning money via its loss-making mobile phones division. Indeed, its need for cash has seen it already pull on Microsoft’s purse, drawing down €1.5 billion ($2 billion) in convertible bonds from Redmond a few days after the deal was announced.

Despite hemorrhaging cash in recent years as its share of the smartphone market slumped from major to marginal, Nokia announced a surprise profit of €118 million in its Q3 earnings last month, swinging back from a €115 million loss last quarter, and a €564 million loss in the year ago quarter. If that was the beginning of a turnaround for its devices unit, it’s come too late for Nokia to hold onto it, however.

Post-devices, Nokia is concentrating its efforts on three business divisions: its networking business, NSN; its location services business, HERE; and a new business division called Advanced Technologies which encompasses its patent portfolio and also ongoing R&D efforts in areas such as sensing, connectivity, materials and web and cloud technologies.

Details of the terms of the deal with Microsoft, as set out by Nokia for its shareholders to consider ahead of today’s meeting, can be found here.

The key paragraphs detailing the transaction terms are as follows:

The purpose of the Extraordinary General Meeting is for you and our other shareholders to consider and vote on a proposal to confirm and approve the transactions contemplated by the Stock and Asset Purchase Agreement, dated as of September 2, 2013 (the “Purchase Agreement”), by and between Nokia Corporation and Microsoft International Holdings B.V. (“Microsoft International”), a wholly owned subsidiary of Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”). Under the Purchase Agreement, Nokia will sell substantially all of its Devices & Services business (the “D&S Business”), including assets and liabilities to the extent primarily related thereto, to Microsoft International (the transactions contemplated by the Purchase Agreement, the “Sale of the D&S Business”) for an aggregate purchase price of EUR 3.79 billion in cash, subject to certain adjustments.

Nokia has also entered into a mutual licensing agreement (the “Patent License Agreement”) with Microsoft that will become effective upon consummation of the Sale of the D&S Business and a payment to Nokia of EUR 1.55 billion, and, as consideration for Microsoft’s unilateral right to extend the term of the Patent License Agreement to perpetuity, an additional payment of EUR 100 million to Nokia.

Under the Patent License Agreement, Nokia will grant Microsoft a 10-year license to certain of Nokia’s patents and Microsoft will grant Nokia reciprocal rights to certain of Microsoft’s patents for use in Nokia’s HERE business. Upon consummation of the Sale of the D&S Business, Microsoft will also become a strategic licensee of the HERE location platform and will pay Nokia separately for the services provided under this license.

Microsoft is expected to become one of the top three customers of HERE. Nokia will retain the Nokia brand and all of its patents and patent applications worldwide, provided that certain registered design rights that are specific to the D&S Business will be included in the assets transferred to Microsoft.

The Sale of the D&S Business and the licensing arrangements described above are expected to be significantly accretive to Nokia’s earnings as each of Nokia’s continuing businesses, NSN, HERE and Advanced Technologies are global leaders in enabling mobility in their respective areas. The Sale of the D&S Business and the licensing arrangements described above are also expected to significantly strengthen Nokia’s financial position and provide a solid basis for future investment in the continuing businesses.

During the first half of 2013, we estimate that the non-IFRS result of the business proposed to be sold, “substantially all of Devices & Services business” would have been a loss of EUR 395 million and net sales of that business would have been EUR 5.3 billion. For the same period of time (on a pro forma basis) the non-IFRS result of Nokia’s continuing businesses would have been a profit of EUR 436 million and the net sales of Nokia’s continuing businesses would have been EUR 6.3 billion. On a pro forma basis Nokia had EUR 12.8 billion of gross cash and EUR 7.5 billion of net cash at the end of the first half of 2013.

Nokia’s Tablet Gambit Will Drive Mobile Market Share For Microsoft If The Margins Hold Up

Yoogle: Nokia’s Lumia 2520 tablet will set you back $500 if you want to buy it flat out. AT&T is more than happy to sell you one at that price. Pick it up with a wireless contract, and AT&T will knock $100 off that sticker.

But pick up a Lumia 925, 1020, or 1520 at the same time, and the price of the Lumia 2520 drops to $200. That’s an incredible decline in cost. I confirmed with AT&T that the phone itself would be subsidized, but subject “to a second agreement,” or contract, so the deal only works if you are ready to pony up for two devices and requisite plans.

So, for the sum of $300 ($100 for the Lumia 925, $200 for the Lumia 2520), you can buy into the larger Windows ecosystem of Windows 8.x and Windows Phone. Why would Nokia do this? You can’t really view Nokia’s hardware choices as independent anymore, but for kicks, the reasons would be simple: Device volume is key to the health of the Windows (et al. form factors) platform.

This means that Nokia does more than help its short-term revenue when it moves devices, it sets up its future by supporting the platform that it needs to stand upon. But Nokia’s hardware division is now all but part of Microsoft’s hardware business, making the above all the more muddled in the best possible way. Let’s do this in pieces:

Nokia lashes its tablet and smartphone hardware together, using carrier subsidies for consumers to bear the brunt of its margin pressure, to sell more units and help launch it into new hardware categories.

Windows and Windows Phone benefit from larger unit volume, which brings more users, more downloads, and thus more developer satisfaction.

Developers then in theory build more applications, which leads to happier customers, and therefore more customers, creating a virtuous loop.

Microsoft buys Nokia’s hardware business, which it wants in order to sell more smartphones.

Its new smartphone business is being used to sell tablets that compete with its own Surface line of devices.

So that’s fun, but the real issue here is that Microsoft (Nokia) has compiled a hardware package that it can presumably vend not at a loss that brings consumers onto its platforms (platform, depending on how precise you want to be), in twos instead of ones.

This is only a good for Microsoft if the Lumia 2520 is worth a damn. Early prognostications appear to be in its favor, though I can’t see why I’d prefer one to a Surface 2.

But that doesn’t matter; Microsoft merely wants more RT devices sold, period. And that’s why the later points I think don’t matter to Microsoft: In the Game of Platforms, you either win or you become BlackBerry.

So to Microsoft, shaving Surface revenue in the short-term to bolster the somewhat tenuous Windows RT piece of the Windows empire probably makes sense.

Stepping back, moving units is Microsoft’s current problem, which is of course part of the same app problem that we endlessly discuss. The two are directly entertained. And Windows is bigger than Surface, meaning that it takes precedence.

Can Nokia (Microsoft) keep the deal up and not end up in a cold bath whilst ripping up hundred-dollar bills? (Margin pressure is a bitch). I don’t know, but I bet that Microsoft does. We’ll see if it keeps the gambit alive once the deal closes.

Nokia Lumia 1520 review

The Nokia Lumia 1520 is a phone that takes all the best bits of the Finnish brand and stuffs them into a dramatically oversized package.

The handset, which brings the first round of supercharged Windows Phone handsets to the market, is really rather large. Think HTC One Max rather than Galaxy Note 3 and you'll get the picture.

The Lumia 1520 is the first Windows Phone with 1080p resolution, and it's rocking the biggest screen yet a 6-inch offering in a large, polycarbonate body.

It's also the first Nokia to come with a nanoSIM tray, meaning a number of sad upgraders who realise that once again they'll have to order a new SIM card.

It doesn't make a lot of sense, given this is the biggest phone Nokia has ever created, but does mean that future models will be given a little more design room to play with.

It's also using a Snapdragon 800 quad-core CPU, supplemented with 2GB of RAM, to really make things speed along under the finger.

In our testing, the speed really was there, and it's hard to explain how important the upgrade to the 800 processor really is. We wouldn't advocate an upgrade to a quad-core CPU for the sake of it, but in this case it's a significant improvement over the Lumia 1020.

Everything opened that little bit quicker, the overall speed of browsing (which has always been reliable, rather than nippy, on Windows Phone) was improved and generally you could tell that things were working a bit more smoothly when using the phone.

For instance, using the Pureview 20MP camera was a lot faster in general use, and web pages opened with much more urgency than they had before.

Even TechRadar managed to flick up on the six inch display with more aplomb, and while the zooming ability of the phone was still hampered by the need to use Internet Explorer we still found it to be a real step forward when it came to using the phone for the fun tasks we'd want a larger display to allow.

What else impressed us? Well, the addition of the microSD slot means you can supplement the 32GB of onboard storage with 64GB of expandable goodness. Google and friends might be trying to rip these from our handsets, but we're really happy to see hot swapping on offer.

The Nokia Lumia 1520 will be on sale very soon for those in the US, although other territories will have to wait a little longer. Europe is covered but we've got a scary feeling that we'll be into 2014 before it goes on our shelves.

The Pureview camera is obviously a big step up for Nokia again - it's not the 41MP option found in the Lumia 1020, but it does pop in at 20MP, and loses the extra heft the cameraphone flagship brought.

It also dispenses with the Xenon flash, but that, combined with the Snapdragon 800 processor moves the Lumia 1520 into a more useable option. we got so fed up with the processing speed of the 1020, despite the results often being brilliant.

Another great ability of the Lumia 1520 is the ability to output RAW files, although it can't manipulate them on the device itself. However, it's another boon for the Finnish firm, as it means professional photographers, or those that like to really edit properly, will be able to get the maximum from the photos.

Optical image stabilisation, something we thought we'd be seeing on a lot more phones by now, is thankfully here again, proving the photo-ability of the device nicely - plus the 5MP shareable shot is something we're always glad to see for social networking.

Here, Nokia's mapping team, has combined with the photo guys to create Storyteller, an app that places your pics and other such juicy photonuggets on a map, enabling you to create a location-based tale that you can easily get to by pinching inwards on the snap to jump straight into the map view.

This was handled easily by the Snapdragon processor, and we were impressed with the overall design of the app. We're not fans of the way Here maps looks generally, but this little addition does go some way towards improving it.

The final thing we'd like to talk up is the battery: Nokia has slapped a 3400mAh power pack in there to keep things ticking along. Combined with the Qualcomm Snapdragon 800 CPU this should equate to some really long standby time.

More importantly, this means that when you're taking loads of photos at max resolution you'll be able to use the phone for more than a minute before it dies in your hands.

The price is a little more palatable though for this slice of technological power from Nokia, with the $749 price tag (around £460 / AUS$775) meaning it will rival the likes of Samsung's Note 3 and HTC's One Max in the pricing wars, while beating them both in some ways on specs.

 That's not a phrase we thought we'd be saying about Nokia any time soon.
Early verdict

What's Nokia done here? Made something that we can't criticise from the spec sheet alone? The answer has to be yes: the CPU, screen, design and expansion offerings are all the things we've been gagging to see for months, if not years.

The extra apps are standard fare from the firm: bringing user upgrades in a way that delivers actual performance. we're actually quite intrigued by Storyteller as an app, although it can be a little cumbersome to use.

We'll be fleshing out this hands on in the next hour or two, so pop back later today to see more of an in-depth look at Nokia's flagship. but if you're the odd sort who makes an instant decision and won't budge from it, we can honestly say this might be the first Nokia phone in ages that we can recommend without worry.